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Abstract: Starting with a critique of the epistemological and ontological bases of neo-institutionalism, in this 
article we defend the potential for the application of post-structuralist perspectives to the institutional approach. 
We contend that this theoretical approach, which incorporates an element, traditionally overlooked in institutional 
analyses, namely power, has the advantage of contributing to an enhanced comprehension of the dynamics of 
institutionalization. We apply post-structural perspectives, particularly as presented by Michel Foucault, as well as 
the pragmatic perspectives represented by the works of William James and Richard Rorty, to explicating 
underpinnings of the institutional approach.  We would stress that the affinity between the post-structural 
perspective and pragmatism has been acknowledged by other authors, such as Keller (1995), McSwite (1997) 
and Rorty (1999) himself. Incorporating the element of power into the analysis contributes to an enhanced 
comprehension of the dynamics of institutionalization. In conclusion, we believe that the area of organizational 
studies would benefit by a more all-encompassing vision of the processes of institutionalization, which would 
include power at its core, instead of considering institutions as non-changing variables. Clegg (1989) has 
provided a framework for such analysis and this paper serves to elaborate what some of its philosophical 
foundations might be in greater detail. We would stress that it is not possible to find answers if we just search for 
cause-effect relations, because the explanations found through causal mechanisms constitutes, in itself, a kind of 
discourse of power, as pointed out by moderns such as Hobbes (1650). Undoubtedly, if we take empirical 
research into consideration, what we need is, from a historical perspective, understand the way by which the 
main discourses or narratives constitute, transform and are transformed by our objects of investigation, among 
which organizations certainly occupy a central place. However, it is necessary to tackle this undertaking with a 
certain degree of humility, abandoning the search for ultimate causes to more proximate and local narratives, 
small stories that communicate their own sense of the mechanisms of truth at work. And in these matters, we 
should be bullied into causality. 
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1. Introduction 
The new institutionalism is a currently fashionable trend not only in the area of organizational studies, 
but also in areas such as public administration, sociology and economics, as well as in cultural 
studies.  To a certain extent, this approach is contrary to the basic presuppositions of the rational 
school, the empiricist epistemology of economicism, as well as structural functionalism (McSwite, 
1998). This fact alone may explain part of the positive receptivity to institutionalism in the field of 
social sciences: being positioned as an alternative to the predominant orthodoxy. 
 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to grasp the paradigmatic presuppositions of the institutional approach, 
which is characterized by the lack of a coherent account of the bases for human action in 
organizations. Powell and DiMaggio (1990) acknowledge this failing and stress that, in this sense, the 
new institutional thinking could benefit from interpretive approaches, such as the social constructivism 
of Berger and Luckmann, the ethnomethodology of Garfinkel, the phenomenology of Schutz, the 
cognitivism of Simon, or even the works of Bourdieu and Giddens.  
 
Without these foundations, it is difficult to view the institutional perspective as capable of consolidating 
the theoretical agenda or of being an alternative for research to the dominant perspectives in the field 
of organizational studies.  
 
In this paper, we apply post-structural perspectives, particularly as presented by Michel Foucault, as 
well as the pragmatic perspectives represented by the works of William James and Richard Rorty, to 
explicating underpinnings of the institutional approach.  We would stress that the affinity between the 
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post-structural perspective and pragmatism has been acknowledged by other authors, such as Keller 
(1995), McSwite (1997) and Rorty (1999) himself. Moreover, we affirm that the incorporation of 
“power” into the analysis, contributes to an enhanced comprehension of the dynamics of 
institutionalization.  
2. “Official” perspectives at the basis of the new institutionalism: social 
constructivism and ethnomethodology 
Neo-institutionalists criticize the Parsonian view of the social system as normative order, for focusing 
on the value aspects and excluding the cognitive, cultural and action oriented aspects. For Parsons 
(Heritage, 1984), the value system is an important factor that contributes to the understanding of 
organization and social order.  This normative order replicates itself by means of the appropriation of 
the identity of the individuals involved, turning them into role players who operate on the basis of 
internalized values which they been socialized into enacting.  Action is analyzed as the product of 
causal processes, which, despite operating in the “mind of the players”, are considered inaccessible 
and uncontrollable by them. 
 
The main criticism that new institutionalism levels at Parsonian functionalism relates to the lack of a 
cognitive dimension which, according to the representatives of this approach, may be found in the 
works of March and Cyert (1963), March and Simon (1958) and Simon (1976). The decision-making 
process within organizations is seen as a shift from the old to the new institutionalism, from a 
normative approach to a cognitive approach, from commitment to routine, from motivation to merely 
playing by the rules (Heritage, 1984; McSwite, 1998; Powell & DiMaggio, 1990).  
 
Other paradigms assume a central role in the new institutional approach, among which social 
constructivism stands out.  The main representatives of this approach are Berger and Luckmann 
(2001) who are interested in the “genetics” of truth taken as reality (Canales, 1996) and examine the 
processes of the social construction of reality by contending that the central sociological question is to 
discover how subjective significances become objective realities.. According to Berger & Luckmann 
(2001) the relationship between the person – as producer – and the social world – produced by such 
people – is, and continues to be, a dialectical relationship. In other words, the person (as an actor in a 
collectivity) and the social world act on one another in a reciprocal manner. The product fights back 
against the producer. Exteriorization and reification are stages of a continual dialectical process, 
accompanied by exteriorization, whereby the objective social world is reintroduced into consciousness 
during the process of socialization.  What was “constructed as reality” – constructed by the social 
intersubjective per se – manifests itself simply as “reality”. What is taken for granted as reality and the 
fact of superseding it are registered beyond the directly observable or discussable by those involved, 
who, after instituting it, proceed to live the reality now attributed with full legitimacy. Once reified, 
socially produced reality needs to be covered with a second cloak of truth. Legitimations – right from 
the affirmation of the truth of a maxim to full-scale reports which contain symbolic universes (religious, 
political, etc.), come to represent a “second level” treatise, which qualifies the reality as “fair” or “good”  
(Canales, 1996). 
 
Consequently, we may note the following process: exteriorization, which sees society as a human 
product; reification, seeing society as an objective reality, and interiorization, by which the person is 
seen as a social product (Berger & Luckmann, 2001:87).  
 
According to Canales (1996), knowledge is not only the object of study for social constructivism, 
defined by Berger & Luckmann (2001) as the sociology of common knowledge, but also for 
ethnomethodology, defined by Garfinkel (1967) as the method for common knowledge. 
Ethnomethodology analyses the practical knowledge of everyday life, the folk-methods that generate 
“the reality” which we consider given and obvious; the formal processes by means of which the 
ordinary actor “grasps” action in the context within which it is inserted. During the action, the actor 
takes as given certain knowledge considered as being likewise known and manipulated by the others. 
This basis of common knowledge – activated in each social situation – as well as its rules and 
operations, are objects of ethnomethodological research. ‘Ethno’, in view of the fact that we are 
speaking about knowledge specific to the society of reference of the actor; and ‘methodology’, 
considering that we are talking about formal procedures of knowledge and argumentation 
manipulated by the ordinary actor. For Garfinkel (1967), a student of Parsons who came to criticize 
the master, the social order is constituted as a practical activity during the course of daily interaction 
and does not derive automatically from shared standards of value and social roles. He rejects the 
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view that the common judgments of social actors may be treated as irrelevant in the analysis of action 
and social organization. 
“It is the Parsonian disregard for the entire common-sense world in which ordinary actors 
choose courses of action on the basis of detailed practical considerations and judgments 
which are intelligible and accountable to others, which ultimately constitutes the central 
focus and point of departure for Garfinkel’s treatment of the theory of action” (Heritage, 
1984:34). 
In intersubjective engagements, by means of conversations, participants use tacit knowledge, 
cognitive typifications that Garfinkel (1967) refers to as “socially-sanctioned-facts-of-life-in-society-
that-any-bona-fide-member-of-the-society-knows”. Such conversations are maintained despite the 
inherent indexicality of language, through the ability that the participants possess for relating talk to 
some external knowledge that renders it comprehensible (Powell & DiMaggio, 1990:20). Garfinkel 
(1967) shifted the image of cognition from a rational, quasi-scientific process (in Parsons) to one that 
operates largely beneath the level of consciousness, a routine and conventional “practical reason” 
governed by “rules” that are recognized only when they are breached. For him, action is largely 
scripted and justified, after the fact, by reference to a stock of culturally available legitimating 
“accounts” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1990).  
3. The contributions of post-structural and pragmatic perspectives 
It is our opinion that the main difference between the approaches which analyze the processes 
involved in the construction of reality lie in the basic presuppositions about the objectivity-subjectivity 
dichotomy, analyzed from a realistic or idealistic perspective. Both Marxist concepts, such as social 
production and social construction relate to the processes of reification.  When analyzed from the 
standpoint of the notion of fetishism and scientific facts “a complex variety of processes comes into 
play whereby participants forget that what is “out there” is the product of their own “alienated” work’”. It 
is worth remembering here that both words, namely fact and fetish, share a common etymological 
origin (adapted from Barthes, in Latour and Woolgar, 1986:259). Berger and Pullberg (1966) was well 
aware of these similarities, as his article on ‘reification and the critique of consciousness’, attests. 
However, from the Marxist point of view, the reification process is related to production starting from 
material and objective conditions (which are “taken for granted” in the capitalist structure) and 
according to Berger and Luckmann (2001), reification is a subjective process of construction. Such a 
division reveals an objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy, deeply rooted in our common feelings about the 
world.  In this respect, the contribution of pragmatism is extremely important.  Authors like Richard 
Rorty explicitly propose the end of this dichotomy, as do the French post-structuralists, especially 
Foucault. 
 
For many people, objectivity is the natural attitude of man vis-à-vis the world. Man is born in a real 
world.  As Morente (1930) argues, for the realist there exist things, the world of things and the I that 
stands between them.  Knowledge reflects the selfsame reality.  Truth is defined as the conciliation 
between the thought and the thing.  Such conciliation can be achieved by straightforward formation of 
concepts.  Evolution and the process of realistic thinking involve a continuous correction of concepts.  
In the essence of this whole process, we always find the same fundamental precept, namely “that 
things are intelligible: that things are that which have in their very being the essence, which is 
accessible to thought, because thinking adjusts itself and coincides with them” (Morente, 1930: 134). 
In other words, realists believe that there exists one, and only one, way the world is in itself (Rorty, 
1999a). Realism is not contingent upon ones knowledge. 
 
Such thinking originated with Parmenides and came to fruition with Aristotle and today demarcates 
realism (for which Bhaskar 1975 remains foundational), which attempts to reproduce faithfully the very 
articulation of reality. 
“(...) spontaneous and natural man is Aristotelian; and if Man is spontaneously and 
naturally Aristotelian we should not be surprised at the spectacle afforded to us by 
History, which consists in the fact that, since Aristotle, the Aristotelian metaphysical 
conception of the world and of life has gradually become increasingly ingrained in both 
spirit and soul until it has become a belief; a belief that reaches the very essence of 
intellect, the very essence of the individual soul” (Morente, 1930:135). 
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Realism is bound to take stock when confronted with the existence of historical facts, which gives rise 
to a new philosophical position that considers that human thought is radically and essentially 
conditioned by time and by history (Morente, 1930). It is a philosophical position, known as idealism, 
which "turns its back on common sense; turns its back on its natural propensity and invites us to 
conduct an extremely difficult acrobatic exercise, which consists in seeing things as being derived 
from the self” (Morente, 1930:141). Now is neither the time, nor this essay the place, to give historical 
explanation of the evolution of this new philosophical thinking.  Suffice it to emphasize that the two 
currents of thought, which originate from different precepts, still engage the thoughts of students and 
researchers, be they from organizations or not.  They have generated countless perspectives, which 
today still compete for the status of "superiority" in methodological terms. 
 
The structuration theory of Giddens and the habitus construct of Bourdieu both attempt to offer a 
theoretical synthesis of the objectivity-subjectivity debate (Peci, 2003).  Pragmatist authors, however, 
rather than synthesize the questionable (subjectivism) with the impossible (objectivism) consider that 
the realism-antirealism debate should be left to one side. A perspective that did not acknowledge this 
dichotomy would have the advantage of liberating us from the object-subject and appearance-reality 
problems which have dominated philosophy since Descartes (Rorty, 1999). Additionally, it undercuts 
other dichotomies: words-acts, knowledge-action, theory-practice, and space-time – these all lose 
their raison d'etre. Pragmatism emerged mainly in the work of William James, as a philosophical 
temperament, a theory of truth, a theory of significance, a holistic account of knowledge and a method 
for the resolution of philosophical disputes. Obviously, all these aspects are closely interrelated.  
However, as a method, pragmatism attempts mainly to resolve metaphysical disputes, attempting to 
interpret each concept in terms of its respective practical consequences (James, 1997). 
 
Pragmatism shares a similar view of truth to post-structuralism.  For James (1997), truth is a construct 
– an established truth. No transcendental principle, no absolute truth, no permanent concept or 
(pre)conception may guide the pragmatic individual, thus establishing an ambitious political program.  
The pragmatic vision of truth is the truth that is good for us to believe in (James, 1997 and Rorty, 
1991). Rorty (1991) emphasizes the ethical preoccupations of pragmatism, expressed in the “us” 
underlined in the quote from James.  He argues that: 
“the pragmatist does not have a theory of truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan 
of solidarity, his account of the value of cooperative human inquiry has only an ethical 
base, not an epistemological or metaphysical one” (Rorty, 1991:24). 
But, William James was also a psychologist. He acknowledged that old truths continue to be part of 
personal beliefs, even when new beliefs are added to our wealth of experience. “The new contents 
themselves are not true, they simply come and are” (James, 1997:100). The truth of an idea signifies 
its becoming true, to the extent that this idea helps us to assume a satisfactory relationship with other 
parts of our experience.  An idea is true instrumentally.  The truth of ideas signifies their power to 
"work".  Instead of a succession of ideas, James finds a flow, a current, the waters of which merge.  
The position in the current makes each situation unique. 
 
Rorty (1991) introduces the question of justification to pragmatic discussion. For the pragmatic 
individual, justification is what substitutes the criterion of truth, which is characteristic of objectivism. 
Justifications are constructed in relation to their practical advantages and based on experience.  
Consequently, justifications may also be deconstructed based on the same practical advantages. 
Rorty seems to share the same point of view of social constructivism, in which “we are just the 
historical moment that we are, not representatives of something ahistorical” (Rorty, 1991:30). For 
pragmatism, reality simply signifies the relationship of things with our emotional and active life.  
Everything which stimulates our interest is real.  Being the good pragmatic that he is, Rorty criticizes 
objectivism in terms of practical consequences: “The best argument that we partisans of solidarity 
have against the realistic partisans of objectivity is Nietzsche’s argument that the traditional Western 
metaphysic-epistemological way of firming up our habits isn’t working anymore” (Rorty, 1991:33). He 
also attempts to show that there are sentiments relative to the desire for subjectivity: fear of death, the 
attempt to avoid facing contingent fact, and escaping time and chance. 
 
To be pragmatic is to take a stance with relation to life. Rorty (1991) suggests that pragmatism 
concerns itself with “us”, with solidarity.  The “us” has two components, namely the I and the other(s), 
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but it also implies a relationship between these components.  We tackle this object mainly as a 
relationship by means of which the two parts may be (trans)formed. 
 
Although not so often remarked, Foucault’s concept of discourse – a "unit" of knowledge present at a 
particular period in time – is based on the same ontological presupposition as pragmatism, specifically 
with respect to the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy. In The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
(1972) distances himself from an objectivist and/or subjectivist positioning in discourse.  In the study 
of discursive processes, Foucault (1972:63) proposes “avoiding ‘things’”, suppressing the moment of 
“things themselves”, albeit without resorting to the linguistic analysis of significance.  In a Foucauldian 
analysis “words are as deliberately absent as the things themselves” (Foucault, 1972:63-4). 
“ (…) 'discourses', in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might 
expect, a mere intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a 
manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; (...) analysing discourses themselves, one 
sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the 
emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice. (...) A task that consists of 
not - of no longer treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to 
contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak” (Foucault, 1972:64).  
Many other examples, which do not acknowledge the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy, are present in 
the work of Foucault, demonstrating his affinity with the pragmatism. Nonetheless, for the purposes of 
this work we will concentrate here on the concept of discourse. Foucault (1972) uses the concept of 
discourse to refer to relations, which favor the process of the formation of objects.  He studies the 
process of discursive formation, defined on the basis of a set of relations, attempting to show that any 
object of the discourse in question finds its place, its law of appearance. 
“These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, 
behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of 
characterisation; and these relations are not present in the object; it is not they that are 
deployed when the object is being analyzed; they do not indicate the web, the immanent 
rationality, that ideal nervure that reappears totally or in part when one conceives of the 
object in the truth of its concept. They do not define its internal constitution, but what 
enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to 
them, to define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in 
short, to be placed in a field of exteriority” (Foucault, 1972:59-60) 
Therefore, discursive relations are not inherent in the discourse though neither are they exterior 
relations, which would limit them or would impose certain forms, or would force them in certain 
circumstances to say certain things. They are, to a certain extent, the limit of the discourse and 
characterize the discourse as a practice. The discourse should be considered a practice that 
systematically forms the objects which are being talked about. The set of rules imminent to a practice 
define its specific nature. Hence the current use of the concept of discursive practices in research 
influenced by the Foucauldian perspective is a case of tautology. The word discourse per se already 
includes the dimension of practice. 
 
To seek for the unity of a discourse is a quest for dispersion of elements, described in its singularity of 
establishing specific rules according to which objects, enunciations, concepts, and theoretical options 
were formed. The unity of the discourse lies in this system, which controls and allows its formation. 
When we speak of a system of formation, this not only includes the juxtaposition, the coexistence or 
interaction of heterogeneous elements (institutions, techniques, social groups, perceptive 
organizations, relations between sundry discourses) but also its relationship through discursive 
practice (Foucault, 1972). 
 
Foucault incorporates the dimension of power in his analysis, basing his work on Nietzsche and using 
an approach similar to that which pragmatism developed, spoke of the politics of truth. He argued that 
knowledge was invented, that is that it has no origin. 
“knowledge is simply the outcome of the interplay, the encounter, the junction, the 
struggle, and the compromise between the instincts. Something it’s produced because 
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the instincts meet, fight one another, and at the end of their battles finally reach a 
compromise. That something is knowledge” (Foucault, 1994:8). 
Just as knowledge is in no way related to nature and is not derived from human nature, it is also not 
related to the world to be known, has no affinity with this world to be known, or with things. The world 
does not attempt to imitate man; the world knows no laws. It is here that we find the first rupture 
between knowledge and things. Thus, if we really want to know what knowledge is and understand its 
very essence and its production, we should turn to politics rather than to philosophy. We can discover 
what knowledge is by examining the relations between struggle and power, the way in which people 
and things hate each other, fight and strive to dominate each other, and exercise power relationships 
over one another. Since pure knowledge per se does not exist, we should attempt to understand the 
politics of truth. 
 
Foucault (1972) seeks to differentiate between the concept of discourse and the Marxist concept of 
ideology. For him, the relations between power and knowledge are inseparable, because within any 
society exists a “regime of truth” with its particular mechanisms for the production of truth. He 
describes contemporary societies as having a "'political economy' of truth" characterized by five traits:  
? "Truth" is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it  
? It subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for 
economic production as for political power) 
? It is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through 
apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, 
notwithstanding certain strict limitations) 
? It is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political 
and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media) 
? It is the issue of a whole political debate and social-confrontation ("ideological" struggles) 
(Diamond & Quinby, 1988).  
The discursive field, wherein the time-space dimension is appraised, is another important concept for 
Foucault. The field is the space in which discursive happenings are situated. It is in the field that the 
questions of the human being, consciousness, and the subject, manifest themselves, cross over, 
become embroiled, and define themselves (Foucault, 1972: 25). Temporality and spatiality become 
one in the concept of field. The field is time and space, being and becoming, structure and history, 
formation and (trans)formation. 
 
In this article, we set out to include in the scope of the institutional perspective the idea of the 
discursive field, instead of the matrix or network, normally present as the locus (considered also in its 
temporal dimension) and form of movement of the actors in the institutional perspective. It is in 
discursive fields that the processes of reification and institutionalization occur. The process of 
discursive formation (trans)forms objects. By relating the processes of institutionalization with 
discourse, we open up possibilities for the incorporation of a neglected dimension of institutional 
analysis: the dimension of power. We further argue that by incorporating this dimension, we can take 
a step forward in comprehending the processes of institutional “selection”, or simply answer the 
question “Which practices become institutionalized and why these and not others?” This is an 
important point for understanding the very configuration of an already institutionalized field. 
Understanding the struggles that took place during the process of formation of a field, based on a 
historical analysis such as those of Vieira, Carvalho and Silva (2009) can help to identify the main 
explanatory features of its current configuration. For us, these elements are discursive elements, or 
discourses, which represent different powers. Our approach is anticipated in Clegg (1989), in the 
notion of power flowing through those passage points that actors in a field, constantly changing as a 
result of exogenous contingencies as well as endogenous struggles with meaning and its circuitry, 
seek to stabilize as their meaning serving their construction of their power. 
 
As in the pragmatic approach, Foucault stresses the role of knowledge as being useful and necessary 
to the exercise of power, seeing as it is useful in practice and not because it is false – as the Marxist 
tradition has attempted to prove. For Gordon (1999:xviii), one of the key aspects of Foucault is that he 
stresses that what is most interesting in the relationship between power and knowledge is not the 
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detection of false and spurious knowledge – rather that the role of knowledge is valued and effective 
due to its guaranteed instrumental efficacy. Foucault uses the word savoir to denote knowledge akin 
to know-how (a way of making a problem tractable or a material safe to handle). This “average” type 
of knowledge, which cannot be rigorously scientific, requires a considerable degree of ratification 
within a social group and grants some social benefíts. 
 
The idea of the instrumentality of truth, i.e. of knowledge, present in James (1997), is highly similar to 
the interest of Foucault in the role of knowledge as useful and necessary to the exercise of power, 
because it is practically serviceable and not because it is false, as the Marxist tradition has attempted 
to show. However, unlike Foucault, for James the focus of the analysis continues to be the subject. 
Foucault develops the concept beyond the subject to the level of discourse. Undoubtedly, this notion 
of practicability, which is present in Foucault, has the advantage of offering another dimension for the 
analysis of the formation of discursive fields, namely the dimension of power which is, indeed, not 
explicitly acknowledged in the pragmatic approach either. 
 
For Foucault, power is not capable of promoting and exploring spurious knowledge, though the 
rational exercise of power tends to make full use of the knowledge capable of maximum instrumental 
efficacy. Thus, two ideas which were present in the investigations of Foucault were the productivity of 
power (power relationships are integral to the modern apparatus of social production and related to 
active programs for the fabricated parts of the collective substance of society itself) and the 
constitution of subjectivity by means of power relationships (the individual impact of power 
relationships is not limited to pure repression, but also includes the intention of teaching and molding 
conduct, and gradually introducing forms of self awareness and identity) (Gordon, 1994). 
 
At this juncture, it is worth tackling the question of the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy again to stress 
that the dimension of power is included in the very presuppositions upon which it is founded. Many 
post-structuralists would agree with the historic narrative of Morente (1930), which seeks to analyze 
the process of establishing the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy, but would argue that a process such 
as this is essentially political (Catlaw, 2002; Keller, 1995; Latour, 1990 and 1999). For Latour (1995, 
p.15), the isolated, ahistorical, argument and objective existence of the external world was given to 
fend off the “unruly mob”, which Socrates and others were so quick to invoke to justify the search for a 
task force of such size as to be able to curtail the power of “ten thousand fools”. Latour (1999) goes 
further and also considers as a political project the replacement of Transcendental Ego (the mind-in-a-
vat) by Society:  “(…) it was now the prejudices, categories, and paradigms of a group of people living 
together that determined the representations of every one of those people” (1999:6). 
“Nothing in the world could pass through so many intermediaries and reach the individual 
mind. People were now locked not only into the prison of their own categories but into 
that of their social groups as well. Second, this “society” itself was just a series of minds-
in-a-vat, many minds and many vats to be sure, but each of them still gazing at an 
outside world. Some improvement! If prisoners were not longer in isolated cells, they 
were now confined to the same dormitory, the same collective mentality. Third, the next 
shift, from Ego to multiple cultures, jeopardized the only good thing about Kant, that is, 
the universality of the a priori categories, the only bit of ersatz absolute certainty he had 
been able to retain. Everyone was not locked in the same prison any more; now there 
were many prisons, incommensurable, unconnected. Not only was the mind 
disconnected from the world, but each collective mind, each culture was disconnected 
from the others” (Latour, 1999:15).  
The political game which is present in the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy is also analyzed by Keller 
(1995). Emphasizing the ideological dimension of the category of the model and based on a 
psychoanalytical approach, the author attempts to grasp the culturally persistent association between 
objectivity and masculinity. She shows that this association reflects and contributes to a complex 
network of cognitive, emotional and sexual development. In order to see how the objectives of 
science – knowledge and power – are translated in terms of objectification and domination, Keller 
examines the psycho-dynamic roots that bring these objectives together. “Objectivity, I argue, is the 
cognitive counterpart of psychological autonomy, and accordingly must be understood as rooted in 
interpersonal space; the capacity for objectivity develops together with the articulation of self and of 
gender” (Keller, 1995:71). The relations between objectivity, power and domination are seen from the 
basis of an interpersonal perspective, even in non-humans. 
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As we saw earlier, Foucault not only acknowledges this political dimension, which is present in the 
objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy, but also carefully conjoins the dimension of power to the analysis of 
discourse.  The concept of power is not merely present in Foucauldian analysis.  It is by means of the 
relations of power that the very process of discursive formation is made possible. 
4. Reappraisal of some concepts 
Starting from the classic perspective of institutionalization, we may reach the mistaken conclusion that 
everything, at least theoretically, has the potential for institutionalization.  Especially when we use the 
notion of institution as being synonymous with "true entity" (for example, a regulatory entity in the 
educational field) we may be led to consider the process of institutionalization or institutional change 
as a conscious and simple process.  In fact, only certain practices become institutionalized and the 
new institutionalism cannot come up with answers for this selective process. 
 
Starting from a pragmatic premise, one would stress that the practices which are institutionalized are 
practices which "work", which are "good for us". Institutionalization occurs within discursive fields 
predominant in a given society.  By proposing that the institutional processes occur within discursive 
fields, we are arguing that these are unconsciously serving the productivity of the power relations 
present in these fields.  Practices which are institutionalized are practices which "work", in other 
words, they are practices which are necessary and useful to the exercise of power.  In this work, 
these discourses (practices) are called practical discourses, in order to highlight the dimension of 
practicability. 
 
Keller (1995) contributes to the philosophy of the science by merging the pragmatic and the 
Foucauldian conceptions in the analysis of the formation of new scientific fields. In the study of the 
formation of the scientific field of genetics in the USA, Keller (1995) developed an interesting 
theoretical body of knowledge regarding the role of language and dynamics of institutionalization.  
However, she not only focuses on language (particularly the role of metaphors) but also emphasizes 
the complex networks of influence and interaction which arise between norms, technical 
developments and metaphors. The force of the descriptive expressions is derived from the role of 
metaphors in the construction of similarity and difference, defining "familiar similarities" which form the 
basis that serves to categorize natural phenomena and motivates the realization of certain 
experiments or the elaboration of certain technical parameters. Not all metaphors are equally useful or 
catchy, or even equally practical. The effectiveness of metaphors depends upon the shared social 
conventions and also upon the authority conventionally granted upon those who use them, namely 
institutions. The socially effective metaphor of 20 years ago may not continue to be effective today, 
partly due to the dramatic transformations (as for example, gender) of prevailing discourses. 
 
The effectiveness of scientific metaphors depends not only upon the available social resources but 
also upon the availability of technical and natural resources.  Some metaphors may be cognitively and 
technologically more productive than others and they may also have different effects.  In Keller's 
approach (1995) the scientific technique not only contributes, but is also produced by discourse.  The 
traffic between metaphors and machines has transforming effects on the terms of social history or 
scientific techniques themselves. In this context, the human/non-human distinction does not exist 
(Latour, 1999) and the (trans)formative aspects of the new field depend upon discourse.  Scientific 
objects are constituted and, at the same time, transformed, by discourse. 
 
To sum up, it is possible to reply to the query of Powell & DiMaggio (1999:38) “given that anything 
that enters into human interaction can become the basis of a shared typification, why are some 
typifications (the nation, the family, private property) so much more compelling that others (counties, 
second cousins, the commons)?”  A cognitive theory of action cannot cover all the different replies in 
affective and normative terms. Nonetheless, a theory of discourse may reunite the dimensions 
discussed in other perspectives, namely the affective, normative, cognitive and political dimensions. 
The presence of these typifications will depend upon how they are situated in the field of power 
relations of the discourses. 
5. Conclusions 
Although the neo-institutional approach is currently in fashion in the area of organizational studies, it 
presents some shortfalls in terms of possibilities for human action in organizations.   Furthermore, the 
main contribution of this perspective is concentrated more on the analysis of institutions – seeing 
them as taken for granted – than on the analysis of processes of institutionalization.  In this paper, we 
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argue that the referential basis provided by the post-structuralism of Foucault and the pragmatism of 
James and Rorty can contribute to strengthening the micro-basis for action of the approach and 
concomitantly, aid understanding of the processes of institutionalization. All the "official" 
representatives of institutionalism acknowledge that the processes they research do not arise in a 
vacuum. On the contrary, by using words such as network of organizations and matrix, they attempt to 
stress the complexity of processes of institutionalization.  However, the problem lies in the basic 
presuppositions of their perspectives.  By arguing that the subject-object dichotomy serves political 
interests and has severe practical consequences, we assume the pragmatic stance of Rorty and 
present Foucault’s concept of discourse as an alternative for understanding the processes of 
institutionalization. 
 
It is no accident that the concept of discourse is introduced as an alternative to the official currents of 
institutionalism.  Discourse, for Foucault, overcomes the subject-object dichotomy, because it talks 
truth into being and thus, we would argue, adds more dynamism to the study of processes of 
institutionalization, including some often neglected dimensions in institutional analysis, namely 
normative, cognitive, affective and power dimensions.  Discourse is not merely the crossroads 
between things and words.  It does not involve a set of signals; rather it consists of practices, which 
systematically form the objects of which they speak.  Situated beyond things and words, the concept 
of discourse overcomes the objectivity-subjectivity debate and opens up another space for discussion, 
which concentrates attention on rules of formation, on relations of power which (trans)form fields.  The 
concept of discourse takes into consideration the complexity of institutionalization processes and 
contributes in terms of bases for institutional analysis – in this case, without the division based on the 
micro/macro dichotomy. 
 
The concept of practicability arises as the key to the comprehension of processes of 
institutionalization.  Introduced by American pragmatism, it is also present in the ethnomethodology of 
Garfinkel.  However, we have opted to use this concept in the same way as Foucault uses it, 
incorporating the dimension of power and arguing that knowledge, in practical terms, is useful and 
necessary to the exercise of power. In this way, it is possible to take a step forward in understanding 
the selective aspects of institutionalization and grasp how these processes serve the relations of 
power present in discursive fields.  Practices that become institutionalized in organizations are 
practices that "work"; in other words, practices which are both necessary and useful to relations of 
power. 
 
In conclusion, we believe that the area of organizational studies would benefit by a more all-
encompassing vision of the processes of institutionalization, which would include power at its core, 
instead of considering institutions as non-changing variables. Clegg (1989) has provided a framework 
for such analysis and this paper serves to elaborate what some of its philosophical foundations might 
be in greater detail. As we have already done in earlier works, we would stress that it is not possible 
to find answers if we just search for cause-effect relations, because the explanations found through 
causal mechanisms constitutes, in itself, a kind of discourse of power, as pointed out by moderns 
such as Hobbes (1650). Undoubtedly, if we take empirical research into consideration, what we need 
is, from a historical perspective, understand the way by which the main discourses or narratives 
constitute, transform and are transformed by our objects of investigation, among which organizations 
certainly occupy a central place. However, it is necessary to tackle this undertaking with a certain 
degree of humility, abandoning the search for ultimate causes to more proximate and local narratives, 
small stories that communicate their own sense of the mechanisms of truth at work. And in these 
matters, we should be bullied into causality. 
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